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Abstract— Smart grid is an emerging and promising 
technology. It uses the power of information technologies to 
deliver intelligently the electrical power to customers, and it 
allows the integration of the green technology to meet the 
environmental requirements. Unfortunately, information 
technologies have its inherent vulnerabilities and weaknesses 
that expose the smart grid to a wide variety of security risks. The 
Intrusion detection system (IDS) plays an important role in 
securing smart grid networks and detecting malicious activity, 
yet it suffers from several limitations. Many research papers 
have been published to address these issues using several 
algorithms and techniques. Therefore, a detailed comparison 
between these algorithms is needed. This paper presents an 
overview of four data mining algorithms used by IDS in Smart 
Grid. An evaluation of performance of these algorithms is 
conducted based on several metrics including the probability of 
detection, probability of false alarm, probability of miss 
detection, efficiency, and processing time. Results show that 
Random Forest outperforms the other three algorithms in 
detecting attacks with higher probability of detection, lower 
probability of false alarm, lower probability of miss detection, 
and higher accuracy.   
Keywords— Smart Grid, IDS, Data mining algorithms, 
probability of detection, probability of false alarm, Random 
Forest, Naïve Bayes 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Smart grid is an emerging and promising technology. It 
uses the power of data communication to deliver intelligently 
the electrical power and meet the environmental requirements. 
Compared to the traditional power grid, smart grid provides 
new functionalities such as real-time control, two-way flow of 
information communication, operational efficiency, and grid 
resilience [1]. Because of the inherent vulnerabilities of 
communications systems, smart grid can be subject to a wide 
variety of security attacks. One of the systems for detecting 
malicious activity and securing the networks is the intrusion 
detection system (IDS).  
IDS is based on three distinct approaches in detecting 
abnormalities: signature-based, specification-based, and 
anomaly-based. The first approach consists in detecting 
patterns of malicious activities using a database of well-
known attack signatures. The second approach consists in 
identifying deviation from normal behavior profiles using 
logical specifications. The third approach consists in looking 
for deviations from normal behavior profiles using statistical 
measures [2]. According to Faisal et al. [3], anomaly-based 
technique is more applicable and suitable approach for smart 
grid than signature-based and specification-based techniques.  
Despite its wide use, intrusion detection system (IDS) 
suffers from several performance limitations, including 
limited detection accuracy and high rate of false positive [4]. 
Thus, a number of researchers tried to improve its 
performance by proposing other techniques and algorithms. 
For example, Zhang et al. [5] proposed a distributed intrusion 
detection system for smart grid using artificial immune system 
and support vector machine algorithms. Ten et al. [6] proposed 
a substation detection algorithm that can be used to 
systematically extract malicious “footprints” of intrusion-
based steps across substation networks. Berthier et al. [7] 
proposed a specification-based IDS for advanced metering 
infrastructure using sensors. Faisal et al. [3] proposed an 
anomaly based IDS for the advanced metering infrastructure 
(AMI) using several data stream mining techniques.  
To the best of our knowledge, no previous work compared 
the performance of data mining algorithms used by anomaly-
based IDS in smart grid networks. This paper fills this gap by 
evaluating the performance of four data mining algorithms 
which are: Naïve Bayes [8], Decision tree [8], Support Vector 
Machine [9], and Random Forest [10]. They have been used 
separately in several works with IDS, especially in the Smart 
Grid network, and they have produced satisfactory results. 
The benchmark NSL-KDD [11] dataset is selected for this 
evaluation. The evaluation is based on several metrics 
including the probability of detection, probability of false 
alarm, probability of miss detection, efficiency, and 
processing time. 
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. In 
section II, we describe the data mining algorithms used in this 
work. Section III presents the metrics used for evaluating the 
algorithms and discusses the results of the simulations. Some 
conclusions are drawn in the final section. 
II. DATA MINING ALGORITHMS  
In this work, we selected one algorithm from each of the 
four categories: Bayes model [19], Decision tree model [20], 
function model [16], and ensemble model [14]. These 
algorithms are: Naïve Bayes (NB), Decision tree (DT), 
Support Vector Machine (SVM), and Random Forest (RF). 
These algorithms have been used separately in several works 
with IDS, especially in the Smart Grid network, and they have 
produced satisfactory results. A description of each of these 
algorithms is given below. 
A. Naive Bayes (NB) 
Bayes network is a widely used graphical model to 
represent and handle uncertain information [15]. NB is a 
simple Bayes network with the “naive” assumption of 
independence between child nodes [8]. The steps for this 
algorithm are [9]: 
1. Let D be a training set of tuple and their associated 
class labels. In our case, a tuple is a packet and it is 
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represented by an n-dimensional attribute vector X = 
(x1, x2, x3,…, xn).  
2. Suppose we have m classes, in our case m=2 as we 
have two classes which are attack class and normal 
class. Given a tuple or a packet X, NB will predict 
that X belongs to the class with the highest posterior 
probability. In other words, X belongs to Ci if and 
only if:  
 𝑃	(𝐶%|𝑋) > (𝑃(𝐶*|𝑋)	𝑓𝑜𝑟	1	 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖        (1) 
So we maximize the P(Ci|X) which is given by the Bayes 
Theorem: 
                            𝑃	(𝐶%|𝑋) = 6(7|89)	.		6(89)6(7)        (2) 
3. Because P(X) is constant for all classes, we remove 
it and we need to maximize only the P(X|Ci).P(Ci). 
The prior probability P(Ci) is given by: 
                            𝑃	(𝐶%) = |89,;||<|                         (3) 
Where |Ci,D| is the number of training tuple of class Ci in 
D.  
4. As NB assumes that there is no relationship among 
child nodes or attributes, the P(X|Ci) is given by:  
                      𝑃	(𝑋|𝐶%) = ∏ 𝑃(𝑥?@?AB |𝐶%)                  (4) 
Where xk is the value of attribute Ak for tuple X. As the 
attributes A1,A2….An in our data set are categorical, the 
P(xk|Ci) is the number of tuples of class Ci in D having the 
value xk for Ak, divided by |Ci,D|. 
B. Decision tree (DT) 
The decision tree is a supervised learning algorithm used 
for addressing classification problem [21]. It consists of 
internal nodes, branches, and leaf nodes [14]. Each internal 
node represents a test on an attribute, the branch is the 
outcome of the test, and the leaf node is the class label to 
which a given object belongs. In order to classify a new object 
using the decision tree, two steps are required: creation and 
classification. 
Several algorithms exist to create a decision tree including 
ID3, C4.5, and CART. In this work, we selected C4.5 (J48 in 
Weka) and it works as follows [14]: 
Let D and Attribute_list are the inputs, where D is the 
training set and their associated class labels, in our case there 
are two class labels: attack and normal. Attribute_list is the list 
of attributes describing the tuples, in our case, these are the 
attributes describing the packets. Below is the basic algorithm 
for creating a decision tree using these inputs.   
Algorithm 1: Create_Decision_Tree (D, attribute_list) 
1. Create a node N 
2. If packet in D are all of the same class C 
N = leaf node labeled with the class C 
return N 
3. If the attribute_list is empty  
N = leaf node labeled with the majority class in D 
return N  
4. Calculate the Gain ratio of each attribute in 
attribute_list  
5. N.test = attribute with the best Gain ratio 
 // the best means the highest value 
6. For each outcome j in the splitting of D  
// partition the tuple and grow a sub trees for each    
//partition  
7. if Dj is empty  
N = leaf node labeled with the majority class in D 
8. else  
N = Create_decision_tree (Dj, attribute_list) 
endFor  
9. return N 
 
C4.5 uses the Gain ratio (step 4) method for selecting the 
attribute that separates the given tuples according to class. It 
is defined as follows:  
 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜(𝐴) = IJ%@(K)LMN%OP@QR(K)       (5) 
Where Gain (A) is given by: 
 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛(𝐴) = 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜(𝐷) − 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜K	(𝐷)     (6) 
Where 
 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜(𝐷) = −∑ 𝑝%	X%AB log\(𝑝%	)    (7) 
And  
    𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜K(𝐷) = ∑ ]<^]< 	_*AB × 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜(𝐷*) (8) 
Where, Info(D) denotes the average amount of 
information needed to identify the class label of a packet in D. 
Pi is the probability that a tuple in D belongs to the class Ci, 
and it is calculated by |Ci,D| / |D|. m is the number of classes. 
InfoA(D) is the information required to classify a tuple from 
D based on the partitioning by A.  
The SplitInfoA(D) represents the information generated 
after dividing the training data set D into v partitions where 
each partition is the outcomes of a test on an attribute A. It is 
given by:  
 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜K(𝐷) = −∑ ]<^]< 	_*AB × log\( ]<^]< 	)       (9) 
After building the decision tree, the DT classifies a new 
tuple or packet by starting at the root node of the tree, 
evaluating the test, and taking the branch appropriate to the 
outcome. This process is continued until a leaf is encountered, 
at which time the new tuple is asserted to belong to the class 
named by the leaf [1]. 
 
C. Support Vector machine (SVM) 
SVM is a machine learning algorithm used for 
classification and regression [2]. It is based on a hyper line 
classifier, which separates and maximizes the margin between 
two classes [3]. 
Let the data set D be given as {(x1, y1),(x2, y2),(x3, y3),...,(xN, 
yN)} where xi is the set of training tuples with associated class 
label yi. Each yi can take one of two values, either +1 or -1, 
corresponding to the class ‘attack’ and class ‘normal’ in our 
case. 
SVM finds the best decision boundary to separate two 
classes by searching for the maximum margin hyper line [4]. 
A separating hyper line can be written as:  
 ℎ(𝑥) = 𝑤. 𝑥 + 𝑏 = ∑ 𝛼%𝑦%(𝑥%, 𝑥) + 𝑏i%AB  (10) 
Where w is a weight vector W, N is the number of 
attributes, and b is a bias.  
In case of non-linear data, we can first transform the data 
through non-linear mapping to another higher dimension 
space, and then use a linear model to separate the data. The 
mapping function is done by a kernel function K, and this time 
we will use the following formula [5]: 
  ℎ(𝑥) = 𝑤. 𝑥 + 𝑏 = ∑ 𝛼%𝑦%𝐾(𝑥%, 𝑥) + 𝑏i%AB  (11) 
Where K(xi,x) is the kernel function.  
After finding and drawing the separating hyper line, SVM 
classifies a new tuple or packet based on its position with 
respect to this hyper line. For example, if a tuple lies on or 
above the hyper line, it will belong to the class +1 (in our case 
the class ‘attack’), and if it falls on or below the hyper line, it 
will belong to the class -1 (in our case the class ‘normal’). 
D. Random Forest (RF) 
RF is a machine learning classifier which induces an 
ensemble of unpruned and randomized decision trees for 
classification and prediction [4]. Randomness is achieved 
either by selecting a bootstrap sample from the training data 
set or by selecting randomly a subset of attribute at each node 
of each decision tree [18]. The pseudo-code of the RF 
algorithm is described in Figure 1 [4, 18]. 
After building the learner, RF classifies a new object x by 
aggregating the decisions (votes) over all the decision trees Ti 
in the forest. The predicted class Ti(x) of x determined by the 
tree Ti is the class that occurs often in the random forest, and 
has the majority of the votes [18]. In our experiment, we used 
the default value of Number_of_features and 
Number_of_trees in Weka. Number_of_feature is given by 
log2M+1, where M is the number of attributes in the data set, 
and Number_of_feature  is equal to 10. 
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
For this work, we used an improved version of KDD cup 
99 data set called NSL KDD. KDD cup 99 is a data set 
gathered at the MIT Lincoln Laboratory. It contains 5 209 460 
network connections divided into two subsets: training subset 
with 4 898 431 connections and testing subset with 311 029 
connections [17]. Each connection represents a packet that has 
41 features, 34 are numerical and 7 are symbolic. Each packet 
is classified either as a normal traffic or as an attack. Attacks 
fall into the four categories: Remote to Local (R2L), Remote 
to Local (R2L), Denial of service (DOS), and Probing [7–9, 
11]. Description of each attack’s category along with some 
attack’s examples is given in the Table I. 
TABLE I.  ATTACK’S CATEGORIES IN KDD CUP 99 AND NSL_KDD 
Attack’s 
category Description 
Attack’s 
Examples 
Remote to 
Local (R2L) 
Unauthorized access from a 
remote machine 
Password 
guessing 
User to Root 
(U2R) 
Unauthorized access to local root 
privileges from a local 
unprivileged user 
Rootkits, buffer 
overflow attack 
DOS Denial of service Teardrop attack and Smurf attack 
Probing Surveillance and scanning Scanning attack 
 
Although KDD Cup 99 is considered as a benchmark data 
set for assessing anomaly detection algorithms, it has a large 
number of redundant connections, especially a repeating 
record of DOS category. In addition, there is a bias 
distribution of the four categories which makes an accurate 
classification of the U2R and R2L difficult. These issues have 
been addressed in the NSL-KDD data set [6]. In this new 
version, many redundant and repeated records were removed, 
so the number of training and testing data were reduced 125 
937 records and 22 544 records, respectively. In our 
experiment, we randomly selected 20% of this data set, which 
consists 25 191 connections. Table II presents some statistics 
about NSL KDD. 
TABLE II.  NUMBER OF NETWORK CONNECTIONS IN KDD CUP 99 AND 
NSL_KDD 
Attack’s 
category 
Number of network connections 
KDD Cup 99 NSL KDD 
Training Testing Training Testing 
DOS 3 883 370 299 853 45 927 7 458 
R2L 1 073 11 980 942 1 656 
U2R 105 4 437 105 1 298 
Probing 41 102 4 166 11 656 2 421 
Normal 972 781 60 593 67 343 9 711 
Total 4 898 431 311 029 125 973 22 544 
 
To evaluate and compare the efficiencies of the four 
algorithms, metrics used are [7]:  
• Probability of detection or true positive rate (TPR) 
• Probability of false alarm or false positive rate (FPR)  
• Probability of miss detection or false negative rate (FNR)   Pseudo-code of the Random Forest classifier 
  
 . 
  
  
Building a bootstrapped sample Di from the data set D. 
Creating a decision tree Ti using the training data set Di  
For each node in the decision tree  
Define the number of attributes and select a 
random subset (x1, x2,.., xn), where n is the 
Number_of_features.    
For i =1 to Number_of_trees  
Create a forest of trees Ti.   
• Efficiency or accuracy 
• Processing time.  
The probability of detection or true positive rate (TPR) 
corresponds to the number of attack connections (packets) 
detected divided by the total number of attack packets. It is 
given by:  
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦	𝑜𝑓	𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = n6n6opi ∗ 100 (12) 
Where true positive (TP) corresponds to the number of 
attack connections (packets) correctly classified as attacks and 
false negative (FN) is the number of attack connections that 
are classified normal packets by the algorithm. 
The probability of false alarm or false positive rate (FPR) 
is the percentage of connections that are incorrectly classified 
as attacks, while in fact they are normal. This probability is 
given by: 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦	𝑜𝑓	𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒	𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚	 = p6p6oni ∗ 100 (13) 
Where false positive (FP) is the number of normal 
connections classified as attacks and true negative (TN) is the 
number of normal connections classified normal connections 
by the algorithm. 
The probability of miss detection or false negative rate 
(FNR) is the percentage of connections that are incorrectly 
classified as normal, while in fact they are attacks. It is given 
by:  
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦	𝑜𝑓	𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠	𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = pin6opi ∗ 100 (14) 
The efficiency or accuracy is the percentage of correct 
classified connection by the algorithm over the total number 
of connections. This efficiency is given by:  
 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦	 = n6onin6oniop6opi ∗ 100 (15) 
Where false positive (FP) is the number of normal 
connections classified as attacks. False negative (FN) refers to 
the number of attack connections wrongly classified as 
normal.  
Finally, the detection or processing time is the time taken 
to process a certain number of connections and classify them 
as normal or attack packets. 
Fig. 2 shows the probability of detection or true positive 
rate (TPR) with respect to the number of connections. It is 
apparent from this figure that Random Forest has the highest 
probability of detection, followed by Decision Tree, SVM, 
and then Naïve Bayes. For instance, with 2000 instances, the 
TPR of Random Forest is 98.7%, Decision Tree is 98%, SVM 
is 97.5%, and then Naïve Bayes is 90.2%. It is noticeable also 
that TPR is almost independent of the number of connections, 
except for Naïve Bayes which decreases.  
Fig. 3 illustrates the probability of false alarm, false 
positive rate (FPR), as a function of the number of 
connections. As observed, the FPR decreases as the number  
Fig. 2. True  positive rate with respect to the number of connections 
 
Fig. 3.   False positive rate with respect to the number of connections 
of connections increases for all the algorithms except Naïve 
Bayes. It can also be seen that the Random Forest has the 
lowest FPR value while Naïve Bayes has the highest value. 
For example, with 5000 connections, the FPR of Random 
Forest is 0.5% while it is 9.3% for the Naïve Bayes. 
Fig. 4 presents the probability of miss detection or false 
negative rate (FNR) with respect to the number of 
connections. It is apparent from this figure that FNR remains 
almost the same for connection over 1000 for all algorithms 
except Naïve Bayes. The FNR of this algorithm increases 
sharply for connections under 2500 then slightly after. This 
figure also shows that Random Forest has the lowest FNR 
value, followed by Decision Tree, SVM, and then Naïve 
Bayes. 
Fig. 5 illustrates the efficiency, the accuracy, of the four 
algorithms as a function of the number of connections. As one 
can see, Random Forest has the highest accuracy level, 
followed by Decision Tree, SVM, and then Naïve Bayes.  For 
example, with 3500 connections, Random Forest reaches an 
accuracy of 99.48%, followed by Decision Tree with 98.41%, 
SVM with 97.89%, and then Naïve Bayes with 90.64%. 
Another noticeable thing is that the efficiency of Naïve Bayes 
decreases as the number of connections increases, whereas it 
is almost constant for the three other algorithms. 
 
Fig, 4.  False negative rate with respect to the number of connections 
 
Fig. 5.   Accuracy against the number of connections 
 
 
Fig. 6.    Accuracy of four algorithms for each attack category 
 
Fig. 6 shows the efficiency of the four algorithms for each 
attack category. Due to the bias distribution of the four attack 
categories in the NSL_KDD, we selected 208 instances for 
training and testing the algorithms, 52 instances of each 
category. As one can see, Random Forest detects efficiently 
(near to 100%) PROBE, U2R, and DOS attacks, while R2L 
attacks is better detected by SVM.  
Fig. 7 shows the processing time as a function of the 
number of connections. As expected Random Forest and SVM 
require high processing time, followed by Decision Tree, and  
Fig. 7.   Processing time against the number of connections 
 
then Naïve Bayes. For instance, Random Forest takes 1.04s 
for processing 5500 connections, followed by SVM with 
0.91s, Decision Tree with 0.21s, and then Naïve Bayes with 
0.03s. 
From these results, we can conclude that Random Forest 
is better than the other three algorithms in classifying attacks 
with higher probability of detection, lower probability of false 
alarm, lower probability of miss detection, and higher 
accuracy. It detects most of the attack including DOS, 
RPOBE, and U2R attacks. However, its main drawback is that 
it is time consuming. On the other hand, Naïve Bayes shows 
the lowest probability of detection, highest probability of false 
alarm, highest probability of miss detection, and lowest 
accuracy; but, it requires less processing time than the three 
other algorithms. 
IV. CONCLUSION  
In this paper, we have evaluated the performance of four 
algorithms used by IDS in smart grid namely Random Forest, 
SVM, Decision Tree, and Naïve Bayes. For this assessment, 
we have selected several metrics, including probability of 
detection, probability of false alarm, probability of miss 
detection, efficiency, and processing time. The results show 
that some algorithms offer high accuracy with longer 
processing time, while others exhibit moderate accuracy but 
requires less processing time. As a future work, we aim to 
develop algorithms that satisfy the tradeoff between 
processing time and accuracy. 
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